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Abstract
In recent years modified universalism has emerged as the normative framework for 
governing international insolvency. Yet, divergences from the norm, specifically 
regarding the enforcement of insolvency judgments, have also been apparent when 
the main global instrument for cross-border insolvency has been interpreted too nar-
rowly as not providing the grounds for enforcing judgments emanating from main 
insolvency proceedings. This drawback cannot be overcome using general private 
international law instruments as they exclude insolvency from their scope. Thus, a 
new instrument—a model law on insolvency judgments—has been developed. The 
article analyses the model law on insolvency judgments against the backdrop of 
the existing cross-border insolvency regime. Specifically, the article asks whether 
overlaps and inconsistencies between the international instruments can undermine 
universalism. The finding is mixed. It is shown that the model law on insolvency 
judgments does add vigour to the cross-border insolvency system where the require-
ment to enforce and the way to seek enforcement of insolvency judgments is explicit 
and clear. The instrument should, therefore, be adopted widely. At the same time, 
ambiguities concerning refusal grounds based on proper jurisdiction and inconsist-
encies with the wider regime could undermine the system. Consequently, the article 
considers different ways of implementing the model law and using it in future cases, 
with the aim of maximizing its potential, including in view of further developments 
concerning enterprise groups and choice of law.
Keywords Private international law · Cross-border insolvency · Modified 
universalism · Enforcement of judgments · Model law
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The collapse or distress of businesses operating across-borders can affect multiple 
stakeholders, including banks, trade creditors, employees, shareholders, and even 
entire economies. Conflict between laws, duplication of processes, lack of coopera-
tion between courts or insolvency professionals and the disintegration of the failed 
business’ administration exacerbate the damage.
The norm of ‘modified universalism’1 requires a global approach to multinational 
default, which can resolve conflicts and result in optimal insolvency solutions. The 
norm is reflected in the main global instrument for cross-border insolvency—the 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency (MLCBI) of 1997.2 But the application of the MLCBI 
exposed a gap or uncertainty regarding its application to the enforcement of judg-
ments, highlighted most impactfully by the UK Supreme Court in Rubin v. Eurofi-
nance where the UK court refused to enforce a judgment emanating from the main 
insolvency process.3 At the same time, insolvency, including the enforcement of 
insolvency judgments, is excluded from general private international instruments for 
commercial matters.4
UNCITRAL decided to step into the void and develop a new instrument, which 
was finally adopted by the organization in 2018 as a Model Law on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments (MLIJ).5 The MLIJ has 
been quite well-received and considered by commentators a significant improve-
ment of the current position: ‘[s]ubject to any shortcomings that become apparent 
after its implementation, the Judgments Model Law appears to be a sensible, largely 
uncontroversial adjunct to the Cross-Border Model Law;6 it is ‘undoubtedly a poten-
tially significant step forward in international co-operation’.7 Now, countries need to 
consider whether to enact the MLIJ and if so how to embed it in local law. Adop-
tion may take time, as it is common for several years to pass before countries start 
1 The label ‘modified universalism’ was introduced by Professor Westbrook (Westbrook 1991, p 517).
2 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (1997) with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (2013) (https ://www.uncit ral.org/pdf/engli 
sh/texts /insol ven/1997-Model -Law-Insol -2013-Guide -Enact ment-e.pdf).
3 Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2012] UKSC 46, [2013] 1 AC 236.
4 Insolvency is excluded from the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments of 2 July 2019 (https ://www.hcch.net/en/instr ument s/conve ntion s/full-text/?cid=137) (see 
Art. 2(1)(e)); Bankruptcy judgments are also excluded from the EU regime for enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 12 December 2012 on the jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters [2012] OJ L 351/1). Bankruptcy matters were also excluded from the 
Hague Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters and from the Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agree-
ments. See also Mevorach and Walters (2020), p 4.
5 UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments with 
Guide to Enactment (United Nations, Vienna 2019) (https ://uncit ral.un.org/sites /uncit ral.un.org/files /
media -docum ents/uncit ral/en/ml_recog nitio n_gte_e.pdf).
6 Hawthorn and Young (2018), p 197.
7 Moss (2019), p 23.
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enacting domestic laws on the basis of a model law.8 The global pandemic, and in 
the UK the Brexit process as well, may cause further delays.
When countries do, however, contemplate adoption of the new instrument, it 
is anticipated that this will generate a policy and legislative discussion. The MLIJ 
project took place against a compound background of diverse interpretations of 
the existing framework and mixed aims informed it. Not all countries viewed the 
MLCBI as excluding judgments, and so the MLCBI and the MLIJ to some extent 
overlap. It may be questioned whether the MLIJ really adds to the regime and should 
be enacted. Where it is considered helpful, there are also questions about potential 
inconsistencies. Adoption of the MLIJ may also be an occasion to consider adoption 
of the MLCBI by countries who have not already done so before, and in the process 
could question whether the instruments should be enacted separately or should be 
merged. Countries may also consider adoption of the new model law for enterprise 
group insolvency (finalised a year after the MLIJ),9 and again this may raise ques-
tions of compatibility between the instruments. The work of UNCITRAL on choice 
of law may also impact the MLIJ.10 If the MLIJ is adopted, issues will likely arise 
concerning its application and interpretation (and the potential interaction with other 
model laws as enacted in the country), in individual cases. The delays caused by 
external forces and political circumstances can provide a breathing space to reflect 
on the regime and analyse the MLIJ thoroughly and in context, so that when the 
time comes, it is implemented in the most effective manner.
This article contributes to this awaited debate, adoption, and application process 
by considering the issue of the enforcement of insolvency judgments in the context 
of the cross-border insolvency framework and its underlying norm of modified uni-
versalism. The aim of this article is ultimately practical: to encourage wide adoption 
of uniform rules concerning the enforcement of insolvency judgments, and applica-
tion in a way that can promote fair and efficient results in international insolvencies. 
The article explores alternative ways of implementation, considering the different ex 
ante positions of countries concerning the issue of enforcement of judgments in the 
context of international insolvency, also suggesting how the MLIJ can work and can 
be used in different circumstances.
The article is structured as follows: the next section (Sect. 2) overviews the norm 
of modified universalism, specifically its application to the enforcement of insol-
vency judgments. Section  3 shows how modified universalism is reflected in the 
original model law on cross-border insolvency, the MLCBI, but how the MLCBI 
has been interpreted by some countries narrowly, concerning the enforcement of 
judgments. Section 4 provides a detailed overview of the MLIJ and its key features, 
showing how it was also informed by general private international law instruments. 
Section 5 discusses the new regime for the enforcement of insolvency judgments, 
8 For example, the MLCBI was adopted by the Commission in 1997 but countries began adopting it 
only in the early 2000s (see https ://uncit ral.un.org/en/texts /insol vency /model law/cross -borde r_insol vency 
/statu s).
9 See text to n. 163 below.
10 See n. 175 below.
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comparing the MLIJ and the MLCBI, highlighting overlaps and inconsistencies. 
Section 6 provides concrete suggestions for implementing and applying the MLIJ, 
and in doing so considers different alternatives as well as implications of newer 
developments concerning enterprise groups and choice of law rules. Section  7 
concludes.
2  Enforcement of Judgments Under Modified Universalism
The private international law of insolvency has been evolving as a unique system. 
Insolvency is generally excluded from international instruments on private inter-
national law because of its special character and connectedness with public policy 
concerns.11 Modified universalism is to date the dominant approach for addressing 
cross-border insolvencies.12 It adapts (pure) universalism, which prescribes a utopic 
vision of a single law/single forum system for international insolvencies,13 to the 
reality of a world divided into different legal systems and a myriad of business struc-
tures. Thus, modified universalism seeks to achieve global collective processes with 
optimal levels of centralization of insolvency proceedings.14
Modified universalism is much more focused than notions such as ‘international 
comity’ or assistance, which can be achieved, for example, by opening local paral-
lel proceedings and applying domestic laws.15 Comity generally refers to the estab-
lished tradition among judges within the common law legal tradition to cooperate 
and assist foreign jurisdictions.16 It encourages judicial deference and cooperation.17 
But notwithstanding the prominent status of the concept of international comity,18 
it is considered quite vague and uncertain and is understood differently in different 
systems.19
18 See also ibid. (referring to a ‘ubiquitous doctrine of “comity”’).
19 Mevorach (2018a), pp 99–100. Comity has also been exercised by a rather limited number of coun-
tries and has not been widely practiced (Paul 1991, pp 27–44). See also Westbrook (2019), p 7 (referring 
to ‘the murky doctrine of comity’).
11 See n. 4 above.
12 See Mevorach (2018a), pp 32–38; Mevorach, (2018b), p 1403.
13 See Westbrook (2000), pp 2293–2294. Pure universalism is contrasted with territorialism, which 
would confine the effects of insolvency proceedings to the jurisdiction where proceedings are opened 
(see LoPucki 2000, p 2218).
14 See also ‘cooperative territorialism’ where each country would administer the assets located within its 
own borders as separate estates but may conclude agreements that allow for mutually beneficial coopera-
tion (LoPucki 1999, pp 742–743).
15 Cf. Re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan [2018] EWCA Civ. 2802, para. 79: ‘[…] If it is desired 
to go further, and bind foreign creditors who would not otherwise be bound, the long-standing practice 
in international restructurings of the present type has been to apply for parallel schemes of arrangement 
in other jurisdictions […]’. See also Walters (2019), p 47 (noting the competing versions of modified 
universalism).
16 Fletcher (2005), p 17.
17 Westbrook (2019), p 6 (‘Comity addresses judicial deference/cooperation in light of a foreign pro-
ceeding […] Traditional comity relates to deference to other courts in the same case […]’).
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Under modified universalism, deference demanded of ancillary courts flows more 
specifically from the designation of a main court within a body of law that seeks to 
centralize decision-making. These proceedings should encompass all the business’ 
assets and all its stakeholders, depending on what is most efficient in the circum-
stances—‘[T]he essence of modified universalism is that “bankruptcy proceedings 
[…] should be unitary and universal, recognized internationally and effective in 
respect of all the bankrupt’s assets”.’20 Modified universalism aims to promote fair-
ness and an efficient system through such optimal levels of centralization that can 
lead to global solutions, which benefit stakeholders wherever they are located. It can 
increase returns to creditors as well as the likelihood of saving viable debtors. If a 
business spans across more than one country, it and its stakeholders in any country 
would benefit from an approach that minimizes the costs of multiple proceedings. 
Centralization of the process can keep the business together and prevent its breakup 
in proceedings in multiple forums and allows the conceiving of solutions that maxi-
mize the business and its assets’ potential.21
To achieve this, the central process and its judgments and orders should have 
effect in other countries where the debtor has presence or where stakeholders are 
located.22 Judgments related to the insolvency proceeding include those linked to 
the estate, such as avoidance of pre-insolvency transactions, orders concerning the 
recovery of assets and pursuit of claims by the insolvency representative, or contri-
butions from directors, as well as decisions to approve plans, complete a process and 
discharge the debtor.23 In this regard, universal enforcement relies not just on comity 
(i.e. a discretionary deference to foreign proceedings and cooperation) but on con-
sistent and mandated support for a global central process. Recognition and enforce-
ment of the various orders and judgments originating in the central proceeding may 
need to be speedy. In any event, it should not be conditioned by the similarities of 
the laws of the host and home country.
Modified universalism acknowledges that more than one process may be opened 
because that could be more efficient (for example in mega cases spanning multiple 
jurisdictions and time-zones), in which case several laws may apply. It also acknowl-
edges differences between regions and systems, and the ultimate responsibility of 
sovereign states for their constituencies. This requires a degree of local control and a 
possibility that support for a main process may be denied. Yet, recognition and sup-
port should be refused in limited circumstances, essentially to uphold fundamental 
public policies and ensure that creditors are adequately protected. Countries should 
not be required to defer to a foreign system that falls below international standards 
(i.e. where it does not follow a collective system, which treats creditors equitably), 
and should be able to protect creditors against discrimination (i.e. the unfavoura-
ble treatment of local creditors, whose claims would otherwise be similarly ranked 
under foreign and local law, in the foreign proceeding) and against breaches of due 
20 In re Agrokor d.d. et al 591 BR 163 (Bkrtcy SDNY 2018), pp 47–48, citing Kannan (2017), p 43.
21 See Mevorach (2018a), pp 14–28.
22 See Bork (2018), p 32; Mevorach (2018a), p 25; Fletcher (2005), pp 209–210.
23 See generally, regarding the recognition of foreign discharge, Westbrook (2005).
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process.24 Ordinary private international law rules, such as consent, residency, pres-
ence in, or submission to, the foreign forum, which apply to commercial judgments 
generally, would not be determinative to the recognition and enforcement process 
when insolvency-related judgments/orders emanate from a main proceeding.
Such distinction between enforcement of ordinary commercial judgments and 
judgments related to collective insolvency proceedings (which as such should be 
subject to special rules) was acknowledged by the UK Court of Appeal in the case of 
Rubin v. Eurofinance25:
Albeit that they have the indicia of judgments in personam, the judgments 
of the New York court made in the adversary proceedings, are none the less 
judgments in and for the purposes of the collective enforcement regime of 
the bankruptcy proceedings and as such are governed by the sui generis pri-
vate international law rules relating to bankruptcy and are not subject to the 
ordinary private international law rules preventing enforcement of judgments 
because the defendants were not subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign court. 
This is a desirable development of the common law founded on the principles 
of modified universalism. It does not require the court to enforce anything that 
it could not do, mutatis mutandis, in a domestic context.26
Non-submission or consent by a creditor, namely the attempt to avoid taking part 
in the central process, is exactly the type of territorial strategy in cross-border insol-
vency which modified universalism aims to overcome.27 Once a central process is 
underway, it should encompass and have effect regarding all stakeholders. The Court 
of Appeal in Rubin v. Eurofinance followed this norm and found that there was no 
unfairness in applying a special rule where the defendants are aware of the insol-
vency proceedings:
I see no unfairness to the defendants in upholding the judgments of the New 
York court. The defendants were fully aware of the claims being brought 
against them. After taking advice they chose not to participate in the New 
York proceedings. They took their chance that it would be difficult to bring 
proceedings here, possibly because TCT as a trust is not amenable to wind-
ing up; possibly because the greater part of the transactions impugned in New 
York could not have been attacked here because the repugnant activity took 
place before 4 April 2006 when the Regulations came into effect. Whatever 
24 See In re Foreign Econ. Indus. Bank Ltd. ‘Vneshprombank’ Ltd., No. 16-13534, and In re Larisa 
Markus, No. 19-10096 (Bankr SDNY 8 October 2019) where judge Martin Glenn observed regarding the 
public policy exception that ‘[t]he key determination is whether the procedures used in the foreign court 
meet our fundamental standards of fairness’ (2019 LEXIS 3202 33, citing In re ENNIA Caribe Holding 
N.V., 594 BR 631, 640 (Bankr SDNY 2018)).
25 Rubin and another v. Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA Civ. 895.
26 Ibid., para. 61.
27 See also Aconley et al. (2019), p 122, noting that ‘[i]ssues of presence and submission can be incred-
ibly complex, particularly when the rules surrounding such concepts are not consistent across different 
jurisdictions’.
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their reasons, they made an informed judgment. I have no sympathy for them 
when it transpires that they were wrong.28
But this approach was not followed by the Supreme Court in Rubin29 (and indeed 
by courts in certain other cases), exposing uncertainties regarding the enforcement 
regime under the MLCBI.
3  Enforcement of Judgments Under the Model Law on Cross‑Border 
Insolvency
Domestic systems of law across the globe have largely failed to develop compre-
hensive rules specifically for the private international law of insolvency and, in any 
event, what has been developed in each system has only increased conflicts.30 The 
international community, therefore, designed a separate instrument for cross-border 
insolvency in the late 1990s—the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency (MLCBI). Regionally too, for example in Europe, alongside general private 
international law instruments,31 a specific cross-border insolvency regime applies—
the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR).32 Globally, the regime takes the form of 
a model law, namely a non-binding instrument which provides uniform provisions 
for adoption. So far, the MLCBI has been adopted by 49 States.33
The MLCBI does not say this in so many words, but it generally follows the 
modified universalist norm and indeed has in turn influenced its development.34 
Thus, the MLCBI requires that courts and insolvency representatives cooperate to 
the maximum extent possible in the course of international insolvencies.35 Notably, 
it requires quick recognition of a central (main) proceeding opened in the debtor’s 
home country.36 The MLCBI also provides a uniform jurisdictional basis for recog-
nition, referring to the debtor’s centre of main interests (COMI).37 If the debtor has 
an ‘establishment’ (a place of operations where the debtor carries out a non-transi-
tory economic activity with human means and goods or services38), the proceedings 
31 See Brussels Regulation (Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters (recast) [2012] OJ L 351/1.
32 Regulation 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on Insolvency 
Proceeding [2015] OJ L 141/19 (EIR) (repealing Council Regulation 1346/2000, of 29 May 2000 on 
Insolvency Proceedings [2000] OJ L 160/1).
33 See https ://uncit ral.un.org/en/texts /insol vency /model law/cross -borde r_insol vency /statu s.
34 Mevorach (2018a), pp 111–124.
35 MLCBI (n. 2 above), Arts. 25–27.
36 Ibid., Arts. 15–17.
37 Ibid., Art. 17.
38 Ibid., Art. 2.
28 Rubin and another v. Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA Civ. 895, para. 64.
29 Rubin (n. 3 above).
30 Fletcher (2005), p 7.
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should be recognized as non-main proceedings.39 Local courts are given residual 
control as they decide whether to grant recognition, which is not automatic and must 
be sought.40 However, recognition should be granted as a matter of course based 
on objective criteria (the existence of foreign insolvency proceedings, main or non-
main) subject to a strict public policy safeguard.41 Certain relief (a stay) is automatic 
following the recognition of main proceedings,42 and other (broad range of) relief43 
is discretionary in that it depends on what is sought and it requires finding that cred-
itors are adequately protected.44 The MLCBI also allows the court to provide any 
assistance to a foreign representative as permitted by the domestic law.45
Relief may also be granted to non-main proceedings.46 Yet, the instrument’s pro-
visions primarily aim to support the main process—only the recognition of main 
proceedings results in immediate effects. Furthermore, when granting relief to non-
main proceedings, ‘the court must be satisfied that the relief relates to assets […] 
that should be administered in the foreign non-main proceeding or concerns infor-
mation required in the proceeding’.47
The MLCBI is obscure, though, on the issue of the enforcement of judgments 
and orders. While it includes provisions on cooperation, assistance, and relief (and 
relief may include any appropriate relief48) none of the provisions of the MLCBI 
explicitly mention the enforcement of judgments. In Rubin, the UK Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal (noted in the previous section) and 
refused to enforce an insolvency-related judgment of a US Bankruptcy Court, which 
was the main insolvency forum.49 The US court judgment was in default of appear-
ance in respect of fraudulent conveyances and transfers (an insolvency-related judg-
ment). The UK court concluded that neither the MLCBI provisions on assistance, 
cooperation or relief, nor common law provide special rules on the enforcement of 
insolvency judgments.50 Therefore, the court applied the ordinary common law rule 
39 Ibid., Art. 17.
40 Ibid., Art. 15.
41 Ibid., Art. 6.
42 Ibid., Art. 20.
43 Including the examination of witnesses or the entrustment of the administration or realization of all or 
part of the debtor’s assets to the foreign representative (ibid., Art. 21).
44 Ibid., Art. 22.
45 Ibid., Art. 7.
46 Ibid., Art. 21 (discretionary relief which may be granted upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, 
main or non-main).
47 Ibid., Art. 21(3). The EIR is even more robust where it requires that only one main proceeding is 
opened at the debtor’s COMI and that this proceeding is automatically recognized and given effect to 
in other Member States (EIR, n. 32 above, Arts. 3(1) and 19). ‘Secondary’ proceedings may be opened 
where the debtor possesses an establishment, but the primary powers are given to the main process (ibid., 
Arts. 3(2),(3) and 19). The effects of the secondary proceedings are restricted to the assets of the debtor 
situated in the territory (ibid., Art. 3(2)). There is also a mechanism to avoid secondary proceedings 
(ibid., Art. 36).
48 MLCBI (n. 2 above), Art. 21(1)(g).
49 Rubin (n. 3 above).
50 Ibid. Cf. Cambridge Gas Transport Corp v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Navigator 
Holdings Plc [2006] UKPC 26; [2007] 1 AC 508.
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according to which a judgment in personam cannot be enforced against persons who 
were not present in the foreign country or did not submit to the jurisdiction of the 
court entering the judgment.51
Other countries have taken a firmer universalist approach, interpreting the 
MLCBI more inclusively regarding the enforcement of judgments. Notably, courts 
in the US have considered that the MLCBI, specifically the discretionary relief pro-
vision in Article 21, does allow the recognition and enforcement of insolvency judg-
ments.52 Rubin was not very well-received internationally,53 yet it had further reper-
cussions in the UK.54 In subsequent cross-border insolvency cases, UK courts have 
interpreted modified universalism narrowly when required to defer to foreign judg-
ments, including by applying the old rule in Gibbs (the ‘Gibbs rule’).55
The Gibbs rule provides that English courts will not enforce a foreign insolvency 
judgment discharging or modifying the terms of English-law-governed debt.56 The 
rule impacts on both enforcement and choice of law. Thus, the UK court applies 
ordinary choice of law rules concerning contracts (‘the proper law of the contract’) 
in the context of insolvency proceedings,57 and denies enforcement of the discharge 
when a different law is applied.58 Contrary to modified universalism, the Gibbs rule 
precludes deference to the central court’s insolvency laws and judgments save to 
the extent that the central court process modifies or discharges debts that the UK 
court, applying the Gibbs rule, would regard as properly governed by the law gener-
ally applicable in the central court. More recently, in OJSC, the UK court followed 
Gibbs (and Rubin) and refused to grant a permanent stay which in effect would 
enforce a foreign (Azerbaijani) restructuring plan.59 The Court of Appeal, upholding 
the decision of the High Court, noted the criticism of the Gibbs rule. It rejected ‘the 
charge of parochialism’ concerning the rule,60 given that the court in Gibbs accepts 
that ‘questions of discharge of a contractual liability are governed by the proper law 
51 These principles are known as the ‘Dicey rule’.
52 See e.g., In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments, 421 BR 685 (Bankr. SDNY 2010), 
where the US court agreed to enforce Canadian discharges even though they contravened US law. See 
also Ho (2017), p 167 (referring to In re Metcalfe and noting that: ‘This case demonstrates that the 
Model Law is not against the enforcement of foreign judgments’).
53 Moss noted that ‘[t]he decision in Rubin was perceived internationally as a blow to […] international 
co-operation via the recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments’ (Moss 2019, p 23).
54 See e.g., Singularis Holdings Ltd v. PricewaterhouseCoopers [2014] UKPC 36, [2015] AC 1675; Fib-
ria Celulose S/A v. Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2014] EWHC 2124 (Ch).
55 Antony Gibbs & Sons v. La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) LR 25 QBD 399.
56 See also Re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan [2018] EWCA Civ. 2802, para. 28 (‘As the judge 
went on to note at [46], there is an exception to the rule if the relevant creditor submits to the foreign 
insolvency proceeding. In that situation, the creditor is taken to have accepted that his contractual rights 
will be governed by the law of the foreign insolvency proceeding. But the application before the judge 
proceeded on the basis, as it does before us, that this exception is not engaged’).
57 See also Westbrook (2019), p 3.
58 It seems that the rule encompasses a choice of forum rule as well whereby only an English court can 
discharge English law governed debts (ibid., p 12).
59 In re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan, Bakhshiyeva v. Sberbank of Russia et al [2018] EWHC 
792 (Ch), [2018] Bus LR 1270, affd, [2018] EWCA Civ. 2802, [2019] 2 All ER 713.
60 Re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan [2018] EWCA Civ. 2802, para. 30.
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of the contract, whether or not that law is English law […]’. However, it recognized 
that:
[…] the rule may be thought increasingly anachronistic […] In particular, 
there may now be a strong case for saying that, in the absence of a stipulation 
to the contrary, contracting parties should generally be taken to envisage that, 
upon the supervening insolvency of one party, a single law closely associated 
with that party should govern the rights of its creditors, wherever in the world 
its assets happen to be situated, and regardless of the proper law of the contract 
[…]61
The court in OJSC held, however, that the MLCBI is limited to procedural aspects 
of cross-border insolvency and does not include rules on choice of law. Therefore, 
creditors’ substantive rights cannot be overridden by invoking the relief provisions 
in the MLCBI.62 As noted above, this approach is not widely held, and both Rubin 
and Gibbs have been strongly critiqued.63
Yet, Rubin highlighted a weakness in the MLCBI’s regime: it is prone to incon-
sistent application or no application at all in relation to the enforcement of judg-
ments emanating from insolvency proceedings. Empirical studies have shown that 
the MLCBI has been applied quite consistently and ‘universalistically’,64 includ-
ing regarding the use of the instrument’s discretionary relief.65 The enforcement of 
judgments (and deference to foreign law), however, was a matter of concern and a 
‘notable problem’.66 Requests to enforce judgments and give effect to foreign orders, 
which could be appropriate in various circumstances and could save costs of open-
ing multiple proceedings, were sometimes not sought. This was likely because of 
uncertainties regarding the availability of such relief in the jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, in the Japanese case of Azabu Tatemono,67 the Japanese court recognized the 
foreign US Chapter  11 proceedings under the Japanese version of the MLCBI. If 
the Japanese court had also enforced the debt discharge granted by the US court, the 
foreign proceedings would have been given universal effect. Enforcement, however, 
was not pursued and instead concurrent local proceedings in Japan were opened to 
assess and adjudicate the local claims.
Courts have been somewhat unsure regarding the extent to which they can rely on 
the MLCBI provisions to give universal effect to foreign judgments. The UK Court 
61 Ibid., para. 31. See also Global Distressed Alpha Fund 1 Ltd Partnership v. PT Bakrie [2011] EWHC 
256 (Comm); [2011] 1 WLR 2038.
62 Ibid., para. 89.
63 See notably In re Agrokor d.d. et  al. 591 BR 163 (Bkrtcy SDNY 2018), where the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recognized and enforced a settlement agree-
ment noting (at p 192) that the Gibbs rule ‘remains the governing law in England despite its seeming 
incongruence with the principle of modified universalism espoused by the Model Law and a broad 
consensus of international insolvency practitioners and jurists’. See also in Re Pacific Andes Resources 
Development [2016] SGHC 210.
64 See generally, Mevorach (2011); Westbrook (2013).
65 Mevorach (2011), p 543.
66 Ibid., p 546.
67 Azabu Tatemono, Tokyo District Court, 3 February 2006.
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of Appeal decision in Rubin, for example, granted the enforcement relief (previously 
denied by the lower court)68 under common law principles, expressing a concern in 
this respect regarding the ambiguity in the MLCBI:
What troubles me is that the specific forms of cooperation provided by Arti-
cle 27 do not include enforcement. Indeed there is no mention anywhere of 
enforcement yet the guidance clearly had it in mind. On the other hand coop-
eration ‘to the maximum extent possible’ should surely include enforcement, 
especially since enforcement is available under the common law. I would pre-
fer to express no concluded view about the point since it is unnecessary to my 
decision.69
Even when universalist relief was granted under the MLCBI, for example, by a 
US court in Condor,70 this was achieved after litigation and appeals.71
4  Enforcement Under the Model Law on Insolvency Judgments
The MLCBI appeared to have a gap or at the least there was uncertainty regard-
ing the scope of its relief provisions. It was also clear that general private interna-
tional law instruments exclude the enforcement of insolvency judgments from their 
scope.72 The new instrument—the MLIJ—thus aimed to address this gap or uncer-
tainty, to ‘fix’ Rubin (and other case law following the same approach),73 and pre-
vent further defections.74
However, the background to the MLIJ project was more compound. As noted 
above, some countries considered the MLCBI as already addressing the enforcement 
of insolvency judgments. Pursuant to this approach, the MLCBI could continue to be 
used for this purpose. There was also a concern about asset recovery generally,75 and 
the limited reach of the MLCBI which has not been adopted by all or by the majority 
of countries. It was considered that perhaps a new separate instrument that did not 
fully follow the MLCBI framework could induce greater participation, especially by 
68 Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2009] EWHC 2129 (Ch).
69 Rubin v. Eurofinance SA [2010] EWCA Civ. 895, para. 63.
70 In re Condor Insurance Limited, 601 F.3d 319, 2010 WL 961613 (5th Cir. 2010).
71 Ibid. (the appellate court reversed the decisions of the first and second instance courts).
72 MLIJ Guide to Enactment (n. 5 above), p 12.
73 Ibid., p 11, referring as well to the decision of the Supreme Court of Korea of 25 March 2010 (case 
No. 2009Ma1600). See also generally, Han (2015); Takahashi (2011).
74 The Guide to Enactment notes the concern that other countries may follow Rubin especially as the 
MLCBI stresses that it should be interpreted with due regard to its international origin, to promote uni-
formity in its application (MLIJ Guide to Enactment, n. 5 above, pp 11–12).
75 The problem of asset-tracing and recovery in different contexts has since been further considered at an 
UNCITRAL Colloquium and may be addressed more comprehensively by UNCITRAL in the future (see 
UNCITRAL, International Colloquium on Civil Asset Tracing and Recovery (6 December 2019), https ://
uncit ral.un.org/en/asset traci ng).
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the offshore jurisdictions that tend to host companies’ registered offices but often not 
the actual head-offices or the business (i.e. the COMI).76
The MLIJ, therefore, avoids referring to main, non-main proceedings or COMI. 
Instead, it focuses on the insolvency-related judgment. It also often tracks general 
private international law instruments concerning judgment enforcement, in particu-
lar the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters developed by the Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law, which excludes insolvency from its scope.77
4.1  Scope and Definitions
The MLIJ has a specific scope where it applies to ‘the recognition and enforcement 
of an insolvency-related judgment issued in a State that is different to the State in 
which recognition and enforcement is sought’. Thus, it addresses the cross-border 
enforcement of judgments related to insolvency. This includes an outbound aspect 
where the MLIJ authorizes relevant bodies in the enacting State to seek recognition 
and enforcement abroad,78 and inbound provisions on the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments further described below.79
The definitions section in the MLIJ is, therefore, brief. It includes two definitions 
largely borrowed from the MLCBI—of ‘insolvency proceeding’ and ‘insolvency 
representative’,80 and two new definitions of ‘judgment’ and ‘insolvency related 
judgment’. The definition of judgment is rather obvious and includes any decision 
which may be issued by any authority provided it has the same effect as a court.81 
But the MLIJ clarifies the meaning of ‘an insolvency-related judgment’. This defini-
tion is quite wide and covers a range of judgments and orders. Any judgment which 
‘arises as a consequence of or that is materially associated with an insolvency pro-
ceeding’82 is covered, if it was ‘issued on or after the commencement of that insol-
vency proceeding’ (the judgment commencing an insolvency proceeding is excluded 
from the MLIJ scope).83 The law thus covers both judgments with general effect, 
and orders in insolvency-related litigation between individual parties (in personam 
judgments). The MLIJ Guide to Enactment provides a (non-exhaustive) list of exam-
ples of such judgments, which explicitly include the type of judgments in issue in 
76 See Pottow (2019), p 486 (noting that ‘some states are resistant to the bifurcation of “main” and “non-
main” proceedings and hence loathe the concept of COMI, which serves as the doctrinal foundation of 
such bifurcation’). See also on the position of offshore jurisdiction, Mevorach (2018a), p 70 (fn. 109).
77 Convention of 2 July 2019 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or 
Commercial Matters (https ://www.hcch.net/en/instr ument s/conve ntion s/full-text/?cid=137), Art. 2(e).
78 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 5.
79 See Sects. 4.2 et seq.
80 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 2(a) and (b), which are almost identical to MLCBI (n. 2 above), Art. 2(a) and 
(d) (which refer though to ‘foreign’ proceeding and representative).
81 Excluding interim measures of protection (MLIJ, n. 5 above, Art. 2(c)).
82 Whether or not that insolvency proceeding has closed (ibid., Art. 2).
83 Ibid., Art. 2(d)(ii).
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cases such as Rubin, namely avoidance of detrimental transactions,84 and those with 
general effect in issue in cases following the Gibbs rule: ‘a judgment (i) confirm-
ing or varying a plan of reorganisation or liquidation, (ii) granting a discharge of 
the debtor or of a debt, or (iii) approving a voluntary or out-of-court restructuring 
agreement’.85
4.2  Procedure for Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
The MLIJ delineates the steps and process for the recognition and enforcement of 
insolvency judgments.86 An insolvency representative or another person entitled to 
seek recognition abroad can seek such recognition/enforcement of the judgment in 
the enacting State87 by presenting documents evidencing the existence of a judgment 
and the fact that it is enforceable and effective.88 Indeed, as is common under private 
international law instruments,89 it is a condition for recognition that the judgment 
has effect and is enforceable in the originating country.90 After seeking recognition 
and enforcement of a judgment and before a decision is made, provisional relief may 
be granted ‘where relief is urgently needed to preserve the possibility of recognizing 
and enforcing an insolvency-related judgment’.91
The judgment shall then be recognized and enforced unless the grounds for refus-
ing recognition apply.92 It shall be given the same effect it has in the originating 
country. Alternatively, it shall be given the same effect it would have had if it had 
been issued by a court in the recognizing country.93 Recognition/enforcement shall 
be granted to a severed part of a judgment where this is what is sought or where only 
this part is capable of being recognized and enforced.94 The MLIJ also clarifies that 
this procedure (and nothing in this law) prevents the court in the enacting State from 
providing any additional assistance.95
84 MLIJ Guide to Enactment (n. 5 above), p 34.
85 Ibid.
86 See also Hawthorn and Young (2018), p 197.
87 From a competent court. Recognition may also arise by way of defence or as an incidental question 
before such a court (MLIJ, n. 5 above, Art. 13(d)).
88 Ibid., Art. 11.
89 See Art. 4(3) of the 2019 Hague Enforcement Convention (n. 4 above).
90 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Arts. 9 and 13(a). Recognition/enforcement may also be postponed or refused if 
the judgment is the subject of review in the originating State or if the time limit for seeking ordinary 
review in that State has not expired. In such cases, the court may make recognition or enforcement condi-
tional on the provision of such security (ibid., Art. 10).
91 Ibid., Art. 12.
92 Ibid., Art. 13.
93 If the insolvency-related judgment provides for relief that is not available under the law of the receiv-
ing State, that relief shall, to the extent possible, be adapted to relief that is equivalent to, but does not 
exceed, its effects under the law of the originating State (ibid., Art. 15).
94 Ibid., Art. 16.
95 Ibid., Art. 6.
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4.3  Grounds to Refuse Recognition/Enforcement
The key feature of the MLIJ, and indeed the longest, is Article 14, which delineates 
the ground to refuse recognition and enforcement of insolvency-related judgments, 
complementing Article 7 as well on public policy.
4.3.1  Public Policy, Due Process, and Fraud
The MLIJ includes the usual public policy safeguard, where actions governed by 
the law can be refused on the basis that they would be ‘manifestly contrary to public 
policy’.96 The provision in the MLIJ adds that public policy includes ‘the fundamen-
tal principles of procedural fairness’.97
Article 14 provides additional grounds akin to public policy and procedural fair-
ness, typical in private international law instruments on enforcement.98 Thus, recog-
nition and enforcement may be refused in cases where a judgment was obtained by 
fraud;99 or where there was no due notification about the institution of the proceed-
ing giving rise to the judgment, or the manner of the notification was incompatible 
with the rules of the enacting country concerning service of documents.100
4.3.2  Conflict with Other Judgments
Again, in accordance with private international law instruments on enforcement,101 
recognition/enforcement may also be refused where the judgment is inconsistent 
with a judgment issued in the State in a dispute involving the same parties, or with 
an earlier judgment issued in another State or with a judgment in a dispute between 
the same parties on the same subject matter.102
4.3.3  Lack of Jurisdictional Basis
The MLIJ also allows the court in the enacting country to refuse to recognize/
enforce a judgment if the origin of the judgment is in a forum that did not exercise 
jurisdiction on a proper basis. Proper bases include (i) consent;103 (ii) submission;104 
(iii) the exercise of jurisdiction ‘on a basis on which a court in this State could have 
exercised jurisdiction’;105 and (iv) the exercise of jurisdiction on a basis that ‘was 
not incompatible with the law of this State’.106
96 Ibid., Art. 7.
97 Ibid., Art. 7.
98 See the 2019 Hague Enforcement Convention (n. 4 above), Art. 7(1)(a) and (b).
99 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 14(b).
100 Ibid., Art. 14(a).
101 See the 2019 Hague Enforcement Convention (n. 4 above), Art. 7(1)(e) and (f).
102 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 14(c) and (d).
103 Ibid., Art. 14(g)(i).
104 Ibid., Art. 14(g)(ii).
105 Ibid., Art. 14 (g)(iii).
106 Ibid., Art. 14 (g)(iv).
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The first and second grounds—consent and submission—are typical jurisdiction 
bases for the purpose of recognition/enforcement under general private international 
law,107 and were the bases to refuse enforcement in Rubin.108 The third and fourth 
refer to what is recognized as a proper basis domestically, or at least is not incompat-
ible with domestic law. The fourth requires further clarification. The MLIJ Guide 
to Enactment explains that this provision is similar to the third basis (exercise of 
jurisdiction on a basis on which a court in the enacting State could have exercised 
jurisdiction), but that it is broader.109 It is not limited to ‘jurisdictional grounds 
explicitly permitted under the law of the receiving State’.110 Rather, it applies ‘to any 
additional jurisdictional grounds which, while not explicitly grounds upon which the 
receiving court could have exercised jurisdiction, are nevertheless not incompatible 
with the law of the receiving State’.111
4.3.4  Adequate Protection
Another refusal ground is based on lack of ‘adequate protection’.112 Recognition/
enforcement may be refused if ‘[t]he interests of creditors and other interested per-
sons, including the debtor, were not adequately protected in the proceeding in which 
the judgment was issued’. To avoid delay and litigation, and indeed to clarify the 
type of judgments for which consideration of the effect on the general body of credi-
tors is required, the MLIJ limits this refusal ground to a specific type of judgment 
that ‘[m]aterially affects the rights of creditors generally’.113 The provision refers as 
examples to judgments ‘determining whether a plan of reorganization or liquidation 
should be confirmed, a discharge of the debtor or of debts should be granted or a 
voluntary or out-of-court restructuring agreement should be approved’.114
4.3.5  Interference or Mismatch with Recognized Proceedings
Two additional refusal grounds make certain connections between the MLIJ and 
the MLCBI and its underlying framework of recognizing collective proceedings. 
Thus, Article 14(e) allows courts to refuse enforcement if that would interfere ‘with 
the administration of the debtor’s insolvency proceedings, including by conflict-
ing with a stay or other order that could be recognized or enforced in this State’. 
Article 14(h) includes an ‘optional’ provision for MLCBI enacting States to refuse 
enforcement where the judgment originated in a country whose proceeding was or 
107 See the 2019 Hague Enforcement Convention (n. 4 above), Art. 5(1)(e) and (f).
108 See text to n. 51 above.
109 MLIJ Guide to Enactment (n. 5 above), p 61.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 14(f).
113 See MLIJ Guide to Enactment (n. 5 above), p 25.
114 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 14(f)(i).
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would not be recognized by the enacting country under its MLCBI, subject to cer-
tain exceptions.115
4.4  Article X
The final article in the MLIJ, which does not follow the previous articles’ sequence 
and is thus entitled Article X, clarifies that the intended scope of the MLCBI was 
broad, and inclusive of enforcement of judgments:
Notwithstanding any prior interpretation to the contrary, the relief available 
under [insert a cross-reference to the legislation of this State enacting article 
21 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency] includes recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments.
Article X thus admits that the MLCBI and MLIJ overlap.
5  Overlaps and Inconsistencies
The question is whether, notwithstanding overlaps, the MLIJ still strengthens the 
regime or whether the result is inconsistencies that can undermine the cross-bor-
der insolvency system. The answer is mixed. As is argued below, overall the MLIJ 
adds robustness regarding the availability of the enforcement relief and the manner 
to seek it, but it entails a risk of weakening the law where it is obscure in relation to 
jurisdiction.
5.1  Clarity Regarding What and How to Enforce
The MLIJ focuses on the enforcement of judgments. The MLCBI only refers to 
proceedings. The definitions of judgments and insolvency-related judgments in the 
MLIJ thus add to the regime. The addition is quite trivial though. It was already 
possible, if enforcing insolvency judgments under the MLCBI, to draw from the 
body of case law that evolved in the context of the EIR enforcement provisions con-
cerning judgments deriving from and linked to insolvency proceedings.116 Indeed, 
the MLIJ attempts to prevent overlap where the definition of an insolvency-related 
judgment excludes the commencement of the proceeding from the judgments that 
115 The receiving court may refuse to recognize/enforce the judgment unless the insolvency representa-
tive of a proceeding that is or could have been recognized under the MLCBI (as enacted in the State) 
participated in the proceeding in the originating State to the extent of engaging in the substantive merits 
of the cause of action to which that proceeding related, and the judgment relates solely to assets that were 
located in the originating State at the time the proceeding in the originating State commenced. See also 
MLIJ Guide to Enactment (n. 5 above), p 23.
116 See EIR (n. 32), Art 32(1); Gourdain v. Nadler, Case C-133/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:49, [1979] 3 
CMLR 180; Seagon v. Deko Marty Belgium NV, Case C-339/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:83, [2009] BCC 347; 
[2009] 1 WLR 2168; Polymer Vision R&D Ltd v. Van Dooren [2011] EWHC 2951.
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can be enforced (as this is clearly covered under the MLCBI).117 But otherwise, all 
other judgments and orders are included in both instruments. The MLCBI does not 
exclude judgments from its scope. Article X of the MLIJ clarifies that such exclu-
sion was not intended. The focus on proceedings in the MLCBI derives from uni-
versalism’s aim of supporting a collective, centralized process, including the tools 
employed and judgments granted during (mostly) the main proceeding.
The instruments, therefore, overlap in terms of scope. The MLIJ does not deviate 
here from the MLCBI and universalism—there is no inconsistency on this point. 
The clarifications, although non substantive, are welcome and may reduce litigation 
and delay. The provisions on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in the 
MLIJ add further clarifications regarding process and procedure. Under the MLCBI, 
to seek enforcement, the insolvency representative would need to invoke the relief 
provisions following recognition of (usually) main proceedings. The MLIJ specifies 
what the representative needs to provide in terms of evidence, and the usual require-
ment that such judgment be enforceable, as explained above. Again, this is not in 
itself material but adds clarity. However, when considered together with the clear 
requirement to enforce and in view of biases on decision making (discussed next), 
the additions become material and can strengthen universalism.
5.2  The Default Is Enforcement
Unlike the MLCBI, there is no discretion regarding the enforcement of judgments 
in the MLIJ. Where the procedural conditions are met, the judgment ‘shall’ be 
enforced. The approach here is different and to some extent is inconsistent with the 
MLCBI. The difference is not dramatic because whilst enforcement is required, it 
is also subject to a range of refusal grounds, which go beyond public policy and 
adequate protection—the applicable safeguards under the MLCBI. Furthermore, the 
discretion under the MLCBI is not open-ended. It is derived from the idea that an 
insolvency representative may seek all sorts of relief and that not all relief is ade-
quate in any given circumstances. While a stay is automatic to give an immediate 
breathing space to the business in distress, other relief, including the enforcement of 
a judgment, may be given depending on what the representative is requesting. The 
relief also follows the procedure for seeking recognition, which is based on objec-
tive criteria (the existence of main or non-main proceedings). There are also specific 
criteria indicating when relief that was requested may be refused and this is where 
creditors and other stakeholders are not adequately protected.118
However, the fact that the default rule under MLIJ is enforcement and indeed that 
enforcement is the explicit focused relief under this regime, may promote univer-
salist choices. Cognitive biases also likely impact decisions of countries and their 
implementing institutions. As analysed in detail elsewhere,119 biases include loss 
aversion (overweighting of losses of sovereignty, compared with gains of deference 
117 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 2(d)(ii).
118 See text to n. 44 above.
119 See Mevorach (2018a), Ch 2.
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and cooperation), a status quo bias (preference for the current state of affairs which 
may be territorialist and path dependent), the endowment effect (difficulty to depart 
from existing endowments such as control over local entities and assets) and short 
termism (tendency to be driven by short-term concerns). These biases influence 
choices generally but can also play a role in international law and specifically in 
cross-border insolvency.120 Vagueness in rules can exacerbate these biases and 
undermine compliance, because of the tendency to focus on information that is 
prominent and explicit.121 The rather imprecise legislative framing of the relief pro-
visions in the MLCBI, especially concerning the enforcement of judgments, might 
have contributed to territorial choices of courts and the inconsistent application of 
the framework in different jurisdictions.122 Enforcement is not mentioned explic-
itly in the MLCBI and is only implied within the opening ‘any appropriate relief’ 
language, and the availability of ‘any additional relief’, in the discretionary relief 
rule.123 Being explicit and focused matters. Default rules can also affect compliance 
as studies show that people tend to follow what is presented as the default. Defaults 
tend to be perceived as representing the existing state or status quo and change usu-
ally involves a trade-off. Adherence to a default option may also be due to perceiv-
ing the default rule as representing the recommended, endorsed, option.124
Biases may be especially acute when gains from cooperation and universalism 
are less vivid compared with perceived losses. For example, courts that are asked to 
turn over assets to a main process abroad, to the frustration of local creditors, may 
observe a concrete loss today, while longer term benefits of reorganization, increased 
international trade, certainty, and so forth are more ambiguous and harder to quan-
tify.125 The ability to impose the country’s laws regarding local assets, locally incor-
porated companies and local constituencies may also be perceived as an existing 
entitlement (endowment) of sovereignty and vested rights. Thus, sovereign actors 
may be disinclined to defer to foreign laws and judgments. They may naturally pre-
fer imposing the country’s laws even where the interests of local stakeholders are not 
at stake.126
The decision of the UK Supreme Court in Rubin (and other judgments along such 
lines) reflects such tendencies to focus on local concerns. The court noted that ‘the 
introduction of judge-made law extending the recognition and enforcement of for-
eign judgments would be only to the detriment of UK businesses without any cor-
responding benefit’.127 Even though modified universalism has greater expected util-
ity, departure from existing entitlements may be perceived as a loss—in this case, to 
local businesses, or in other cases local assets may be perceived as endowments—
and be given greater weight compared to the long-term gains.
120 Ibid., pp 49–79.
121 Ibid., p 164.
122 Ibid., p 224.
123 MLCBI (n. 2 above), Art. 21(1) and 21(1)(g).
124 See in more detail Mevorach (2018a), pp 64, 94–95.
125 Ibid., p 67.
126 Ibid., pp 69–70. See also Walters (2019), pp 73–77.
127 Rubin (n. 3 above), para. 130.
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5.3  Overlapping Refusal Grounds
The refusal grounds in the MLIJ are elaborated, but many of them actually over-
lap with the MLCBI. As we have seen, Article 14 of the MLIJ contains additional 
refusal grounds akin to public policy and procedural fairness. These are refusal 
grounds usual in the context of enforcement and indeed they track provisions in pri-
vate international law instruments as noted above, but they are largely overlapping 
both with the MLCBI and with MLIJ’s own public policy provision. The refusal 
grounds based on inconsistency with other judgments are also quite trivial.
Adequate protection is a safeguard in both instruments. The MLIJ narrows it, 
though, to judgments which materially affect the rights of creditors and other stake-
holders, as noted above. The MLIJ Guide to Enactment notes the overlap where it 
says that ‘[a] requirement for protection of the interests of creditors and other inter-
ested persons, including the debtor, is included in both the Model Law and the 
MLCBI’.128 Yet, it suggests that the safeguards apply in ‘different situations’. The 
MLCBI requires that the court considers if creditors are adequately protected when 
‘granting, modifying or terminating provisional or discretionary relief under the 
MLCBI’.129 The idea is that ‘there should be a balance between relief that might 
be granted to the foreign representative and the interests of the persons that may 
be affected by that relief’.130 The equivalent safeguard under the MLIJ has a more 
limited scope where it applies as a refusal ground regarding specific types of judg-
ments. The difference is subtle, and it is only a difference of scope and focus. But 
the clarification of the scope of the safeguard is helpful and can avoid litigation. 
Indeed, consideration of the interests of the general body of creditors should not be 
required, under any of the instruments, regarding in personam judgments.
The refusal grounds in the MLIJ that seek to support collective proceedings 
(allowing to refuse enforcement if that would interfere with collective insolvency 
proceedings or if the judgment originated in non-recognizable proceedings) are 
important, especially if we envisage that certain countries may only adopt the MLIJ. 
But as such they largely reflect the MLCBI, where recognition and relief are granted 
to main or non-main proceedings, and where courts are required to be more cautious 
when granting relief to non-main proceedings.131
5.4  Divergence Regarding Jurisdiction
However, there is one key difference between the MLCBI and the MLIJ that risks 
undermining the MLCBI regime and universalism, and that is the jurisdictional basis 
for recognition and relief/enforcement. As we have seen, the MLCBI, in line with 
modified universalism, is a framework to mainly support the main proceedings. If rec-
ognition is granted to the main proceeding, certain relief is automatic and additional 
128 MLIJ Guide to Enactment (n. 5 above), p 25.
129 Ibid., referring to Art. 22 of the MLCBI.
130 Ibid., referring to the MLCBI Guide to Enactment.
131 MLCBI (n. 2 above), Art. 21(3).
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relief can be sought. It is not envisaged that relief be rejected based on lack of jurisdic-
tion, as the jurisdictional ground is already dictated by and addressed in the recogni-
tion process. The bases to refuse relief are rather the public policy and adequate pro-
tection safeguards. Indeed, in Rubin the court did exactly the opposite and refused to 
grant relief because the party did not consent/submit to the foreign jurisdiction, even 
though the judgment emanated from a recognized main proceeding.132 The decision in 
Rubin was, therefore, rightly perceived by many as a defection from the cross-border 
insolvency framework.133 In declining to assist in any way, the UK Supreme Court 
rendered the decision to recognize the US main proceeding on jurisdictional grounds 
quite moot.
The MLIJ does not clearly reverse the Rubin approach by following an explicit 
framework of support to the main insolvency process. It provides a host of juris-
dictional grounds as bases for refusing the recognition/enforcement of judg-
ments. These include consent/submission, which, as noted, are recognized refusal 
grounds concerning jurisdiction under general private international law. They are 
not, however, the type of bases that ought to determine whether to enforce or refuse 
the enforcement of insolvency judgments emanating from a central process under 
modified universalism. For example, non-submission of a creditor to the jurisdic-
tion where the company has its COMI and where main proceedings are taking place 
should not be a reason not to enforce an avoidance judgment of the main court 
against the creditor, indeed contrary to Rubin.
Other jurisdictional grounds in the MLIJ depend on domestic laws or what is not 
incompatible with the domestic law. The fact that the insolvency proceeding was the 
main proceeding is not explicitly listed as a proper, independent, jurisdictional basis. 
Still, reference to domestic laws or what is not incompatible with them could (indi-
rectly) promote the recognition of main proceedings because COMI has become 
quite a recognized jurisdictional basis in insolvency under domestic laws. Therefore, 
it can be expected that judgments of courts in forums where main proceedings take 
place, based on COMI, will be recognized going forward in countries that enact the 
MLIJ. For example, in EU legal systems, COMI is a recognized jurisdictional basis 
because of the direct application of the EIR, where main proceedings may only be 
opened where the COMI is located.134 COMI is also the basis for recognition of for-
eign main proceedings under the MLCBI which was enacted by 49 States.
Yet, the MLCBI has not been adopted by all countries and the MLIJ is pro-
vided as a standalone instrument—it does not require adoption of the MLCBI, and 
it does not explicitly endorse the COMI (and establishment) concepts. Still, courts 
may accept COMI as a proper jurisdictional basis, also where this is not incompat-
ible with their countries’ laws. Such an approach is not guaranteed, though, where 
there is no explicit agreement on COMI as a primary basis for the enforcement of 
insolvency judgments. Furthermore, in the MLCBI even where it is adopted, COMI 
is only a basis for recognition/relief. The MLCBI does not unify international 
132 See text to n. 49 above.
133 See n. 53 above.
134 EIR (n. 32 above), Art. 3.
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jurisdiction rules nor does it unify a choice of law rule based on COMI. Notably, 
while the norm which centralizes the law and the forum is gradually emerging, 
COMI is not yet widely recognized as grounds for the application of the forum law 
to insolvency-related issues. As the UK High Court in OJSC observed:
Put another way, our common law does not yield to, adopt or enforce the law 
of a COMI elsewhere than here, and the law of the COMI cannot be enforced 
in this jurisdiction, unless and to the extent that by treaty and/or statute that 
law is absorbed into and becomes in effect part of British law. Such assistance 
as a British court can provide in accordance with the theory and objectives of 
modified universalism is restricted to what by its own common law it has juris-
diction to do, or by what under such an express treaty or statute it is empow-
ered to do […].135
As noted above, the MLIJ Guide to Enactment explains that the jurisdiction bases 
are broad and not limited to those explicitly permitted under the domestic law. They 
also include what is not incompatible with the law of the receiving State. The Guide 
further explains that the purpose of the provision is:
to discourage courts from refusing recognition and enforcement of a judgment 
in cases in which the originating court’s exercise of jurisdiction was not unrea-
sonable, even if the precise basis of jurisdiction would not be available in the 
receiving State, provided that exercise was not incompatible with the central 
tenets of procedural fairness in the receiving State.136
A report by INSOL International explains that this provision aims to address the 
judgment in Rubin. In similar circumstances, and pursuant to the MLIJ:
[…] for a UK court to refuse recognition and enforcement of a US judgment, 
a party must demonstrate that although the US court found jurisdiction under 
US law to enter the judgment and provided adequate notice of the proceeding 
to the judgment-debtor, the US court’s judgment violates the ‘central tenants 
of procedural fairness’ in the UK.137
The UK court also noted in Bakhshiyeva v. Sberbank of Russia,138 regarding the 
tension between the Gibbs rule and modified universalism, that ‘the introduction of 
a new Model Law concerning the recognition and enforcement of insolvency related 
judgments as proposed by UNCITRAL may solve the problem if ever adopted’.139
Thus, Rubin might be fixed by these provisions, but that depends on future inter-
pretations of the MLIJ, which is somewhat obscure on jurisdictional bases and is not 
135 Re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan, Bakhshiyeva v. Sberbank of Russia et al [2018] EWHC 
792 (Ch), [2018] Bus LR 1270 (para. 86).
136 Ibid.
137 INSOL International (2019), p 9.
138 Re OJSC International Bank of Azerbaijan, Bakhshiyeva v. Sberbank of Russia et al [2018] EWHC 
792 (Ch), [2018] Bus LR 1270.




fully consistent with the general cross-border regime.140 The jurisdictional grounds 
in the MLIJ are broad and, especially a jurisdictional basis which is not incompat-
ible with domestic law, would not require that the basis be identical to what is pro-
vided locally. Yet, there is a risk that courts might not see ‘incompatible’ as the 
same as fundamental fairness in the public policy/adequate protection sense (per 
the INSOL interpretation in the quote above) where these grounds are already cov-
ered in Articles 7, 14(a), 14(c) and 14(f)) of MLIJ. The fact that the MLIJ refrained 
from making any reference to the notion of main proceedings/COMI and linking 
its recognition/enforcement regime primarily to such proceedings, at the least cre-
ates ambiguities regarding support to a centralized process. Thus, countries that may 
enact the MLIJ as a stand-alone instrument (see further below on alternative ways of 
implementation) without becoming parties to the MLCBI or otherwise recognizing 
COMI as a jurisdiction basis for insolvency,141 may not enforce orders and judg-
ments emanating from main proceedings if there is no submission or consent.
The MLIJ does reject the Rubin approach, though, in Article X, which states that the 
intention is to include the enforcement of judgments in the MLCBI relief provisions.142 
This article, however, is quite disconnected from the rest of the MLIJ text technically 
and in substance. The relief in Article 21 of the MLCBI (to which Article X refers) is 
discretionary, whilst Article 13 of the MLIJ (the operational article on enforcement) 
requires that judgments shall be recognized and enforced if they meet the requirements. 
The MLIJ also includes definitions and procedural requirements that do not exist in 
the MLCBI. Importantly, Article X reflects an international agreement that relief, pri-
marily to main proceedings, includes the enforcement of judgments. The main text 
of the MLIJ, however, does not clearly and explicitly follow the same approach. The 
MLIJ Guide to Enactment also confirms that Article X relates to the interpretation of 
the MLCBI, and therefore ‘it is not intended that it be included in legislation enacting 
this Model Law’.143 As has been observed by the late Gabriel Moss, ‘[t]his is an odd 
suggested provision’.144 The peculiarity of Article X can be explained by the divergent 
views and controversy concerning the MLCBI relief provisions and their coverage of 
enforcement of judgments. Article X does clarify this and resolves that controversy, 
but in view of the development of the MLIJ alongside this clarification, there is also a 
potential for inconsistency.
140 See also Pottow (2019), p 500 (‘This language from the GTE [Guide to Enactment] is a thinly veiled 
(if veiled at all) rebuke of Rubin’).
141 Instead, they may, for example, rely solely on place of incorporation.
142 See also MLIJ Guide to Enactment (n. 5 above), p 25.
143 Ibid., para. 127.
144 Moss (2019), p 21.
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6  Implementation
The practical question is whether in view of overlaps and inconsistencies, countries 
should (or should not) adopt the MLIJ and if they should adopt it, in what way. The 
MLIJ is quite obscure concerning the manner of adoption. It is stated in the preamble 
that the MLIJ’s purpose is ‘[w]here legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on Cross-Border Insolvency has been enacted, to complement that legislation’.145 
This suggests that the MLIJ and MLCBI should be linked and complementary. Yet, 
enactment of the MLCBI is not stated as an aim or precondition. It is only ‘where’ 
the MLCBI was adopted that MLIJ would complement such legislation. It is also not 
clear if the MLIJ should complement the MLCBI by operating alongside it as a paral-
lel system or if it should be interwoven within it.146 As shown above, the standalone 
nature of the instrument is not merely technical and the MLIJ is not easily aligned 
with the MLCBI. Divergences also reflect prior approaches, compromises, and mixed 
aims. It is, therefore, expected that consideration of adoption will instigate legislative 
discussions. Following implementation, questions may arise concerning the applica-
tion and interpretation of the law. It is important that legislators and courts will have 
due regard in this process to the broad context of cross-border insolvency objectives, 
the existing instruments and additional developments.
6.1  All Adopt!
Countries that have considered that the MLCBI already allows courts to enforce 
judgments, might take the position that a new instrument on this matter is not 
needed for their cross-border insolvency system. Article X now clarifies that the 
enforcement of judgments is included in the MLCBI relief provisions. Therefore, it 
is arguably enough if countries adopt the MLCBI, or do nothing if they have enacted 
it already, because then according to Article X they can enforce insolvency-related 
judgments.147
Such an approach would be misconceived. The effectiveness of international 
instruments for cross-border insolvency relies on their wide adoption. Enactment 
of the MLIJ by countries generally and especially by major economies with more 
experience with cross-border insolvency cases and the application of the MLCBI 
would send a signal about the importance of the regime, serving as a nudge and 
inducing participation by other countries, which would promote uniformity and con-
sistency.148 In the process of adopting the MLCBI, which was finalized in 1997, the 
enactment of the regime in 2005–2006 by the USA and the UK gave it a boost and 
145 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Preamble 1(f).
146 The MLIJ Guide to Enactment does provide some guidance on the relationship between and the 
complementary nature of the MLIJ and the MLCBI, noting areas of overlap, similarity, and discrepancy 
(MLIJ Guide to Enactment, n. 5 above, pp 23–25).
147 See also Hawthorn and Young (2018), p 197.




seems to have induced other countries to follow.149 Once a good number of leading 
economies had adopted the MLCBI, there was also more leverage when interna-
tional organizations such as the World Bank made efforts to introduce the MLCBI 
into legal systems, especially in developing countries.150
Importantly, the MLCBI is currently vague regarding the enforcement of judg-
ments. The MLCBI speaks of proceedings rather than judgments, and in its relief 
provisions the enforcement of judgments is not specified explicitly. As a result, the 
MLCBI does not include concrete definitions and procedures for the seeking of rec-
ognition and the enforcement of insolvency judgments. It also does not cover non-
COMI/establishment judgments. Article X does not fill these gaps. It only clarifies 
that the relief available under the MLCBI includes recognition and the enforcement 
of judgments notwithstanding prior interpretation. It does not provide the detailed 
procedure for seeking enforcement. Additionally, the enforcement regime under the 
MLIJ is stronger where enforcement is required (subject to refusal grounds), com-
pared with the MLCBI where enforcement is a matter of discretionary relief.
Where the MLIJ is enacted, foreign users would have a clearer guidance on seek-
ing enforcement of judgments. Implementing institutions in the country could also 
then follow a stronger, more straight-forward procedure when enforcing insolvency-
related judgments, avoiding conflicting judgments and interpretations within the 
jurisdiction, saving litigation costs. Even in countries such as the United States, 
which has been generous when applying the MLCBI, decisions regarding recogni-
tion, enforcement and effect to foreign orders and judgments have not always been 
consistent.151 Furthermore, often generosity has at least partially relied on comity 
(which indeed is embedded in the MLCBI as it is enacted in the United States).152 
But comity is a precarious and unreliable basis for the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments.153
149 In the decade between 2005–2015, more than thirty additional countries enacted legislation based on 
the MLCBI.
150 Mevorach (2018a), p 75.
151 See e.g., In re Elpida Memory Inc, No 12-10947 (D Del 16 Nov. 2012) where the court when asked 
to recognize an asset sale transaction which was already approved by a foreign main reorganization 
proceedings instead applied the domestic rules concerning assets sales, and in re Qimonda (2013) 737 
F3d 14 where the court refused to defer to German law which permitted the cancellation of US patent 
licences, even though the German bankruptcy system was considered in line with fundamental fairness 
standards. Cf. In re Avanti Communications Group plc, 582 BR 603, 614 (Bankr. SDNY 2018) and In re 
Energy Coal SPA (2018) 582 BR 619 where the court gave effect to foreign restructurings.
152 See e.g., In re Daebo International Shipping Co, Ltd, 543 BR 47 (2015); In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 
404 BR 726, 739 (Bankr. SDNY 2009). These decisions were primarily based on the MLCBI as enacted 
in the USA, but reaching universalist decisions required reference to comity, enshrined in the US version 
of the MLCBI. The court in re Daebo, referring as well to re Atlas noted that: ‘Chapter 15 “contemplates 
that the court should be guided by principles of comity and cooperation with foreign courts in deciding 
whether to grant the foreign representative additional post recognition relief”’ (In re Daebo International 
Shipping Co, Ltd, 543 BR 47 (2015), para. 2).
153 See also Chung (2014), pp 96, 104 (noting that comity is ambiguous and ill-defined); Beckering 
(2008), p 281 (noting that: ‘The major historical impediment to achieving sustainable unification in 
cross-border corporate insolvency administration is comity based theoretical analysis in bankruptcy reor-
ganization for dissolution cases’ and that: ‘By maintaining comity as the focal point in the […] United 
States judiciary, which is still possible under the construct of Chapter 15, forward-looking reform of anti-
quated bankruptcy law in foreign countries will be negligible, at best’).
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6.2  Avoiding Carve‑Outs
Certainly, the MLIJ should be welcomed by countries that ‘called for it’, such as the 
United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea, whose courts have interpreted the MLCBI 
narrowly. UK courts explicitly sought clear legislation through international negoti-
ations to be able to enforce judgments on bases beyond the general ones under their 
domestic laws.154 The UK Supreme Court in Rubin, refusing to enforce the New 
York judgment based on common law or the provisions in the MLCBI, noted that 
typically rules on enforcement are a product of negotiations, and that in any event it 
is an area where a change in the law requires legislation:
In my judgment, the dicta in Cambridge Gas and HIH do not justify the result 
which the Court of Appeal reached. This would not be an incremental devel-
opment of existing principles, but a radical departure from substantially settled 
law. There is a reason for the limited scope of the Dicey Rule and that is that 
there is no expectation of reciprocity on the part of foreign countries. Typically 
today the introduction of new rules for enforcement of judgments depends on a 
degree of reciprocity. The EC Insolvency Regulation and the Model Law were 
the product of lengthy negotiation and consultation.
A change in the settled law of the recognition and enforcement of judgments, 
and in particular the formulation of a rule for the identification of those courts 
which are to be regarded as courts of competent jurisdiction (such as the coun-
try where the insolvent entity has its centre of interests and the country with 
which the judgment debtor has a sufficient or substantial connection), has all 
the hallmarks of legislation […]155
Adoption of the MLIJ by countries that have interpreted the MLCBI restrictively 
can resolve the persisting uncertainty in these systems concerning enforcement of 
judgments and orders. In the UK, for example, the Supreme Court may, if faced 
again with circumstances akin to Rubin or Gibbs, change direction having regard to 
the international agreement in the MLIJ, even prior to enactment of the instrument. 
Yet, enactment of the model law can provide the statutory basis for consistent recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments.
There is a risk though that countries that have interpreted the MLCBI narrowly 
will end up applying the MLIJ restrictively as well, or even explicitly carveout cer-
tain types of judgments or scenarios in which the local court may not be obliged 
to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment. For example, legislators could seek 
to exempt the enforcement of a foreign discharge where the debt was governed by 
the local law (following a Gibbs-like rule).156 The ‘trick’ is to see the MLIJ and its 
implementation process as an exercise of international development rather than as a 
154 See also Lord Neuberger (2017), para. 26 (pointing to national inconsistencies that require ‘more 
international legislative action’).
155 Rubin (n. 3 above), paras. 128–129.
156 See Clarke (2019).
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process of aligning and modifying instruments to fit with pre-existing domestic rules 
and practices.
6.3  Alterative I: Adoption of the Model Law on Judgments as a Stand‑Alone 
Instrument
The MLIJ may be adopted almost verbatim with limited modifications as a separate 
instrument like it is designed. The advantage of this approach is that it will ensure 
uniformity and alignment with the original international instrument, and at least in 
terms of enactment, it will demonstrate full compliance with the international law. 
Arguably, promoting the MLIJ as an instrument separate from the MLCBI would 
also persuade more countries to adopt it, including countries that have been resistant 
to COMI—the basis for recognition of main proceedings under the MLCBI. Encour-
aging wide adoption is in line with modified universalism, which requires a broad 
practice of the norm as it relies on uniformity of the private international law aspects 
of insolvency. Indeed, the norm can become customary international law if it is fol-
lowed consistently by countries based on a belief in the conformity of the practice 
with international law.157
If adoption is by a country that already adopted the MLCBI or that is intending to 
adopt it, then, implementation may also include an amendment pursuant to Article 
X of the MLIJ. Depending on prior interpretations of Article 21 of the MLCBI in 
the country, the equivalent of Article 21 may be clarified to say that any other relief 
includes the enforcement of judgments as well. The result is that there will be two 
laws pursuant to which enforcement of insolvency judgments can be sought.
In a future case, if enforcement is sought concerning a judgment or order granted 
by a court in a main proceeding, it may be simplest to invoke the MLCBI. A repre-
sentative may seek recognition of the proceeding anyway, and following this ask for 
various relief, which may include the enforcement of orders/judgments. The rep-
resentative should foresee that enforcement will be granted if there are no antici-
pated concerns regarding public policy/adequate protection. The MLIJ procedural 
requirements can further provide guidance regarding the need for such a judgment 
to be enforceable and not inconsistent with another. If enforcement is requested 
concerning a judgment emanating from another forum, then it may be sought under 
the MLCBI (if from non-main proceedings) or the MLIJ, but there will be hurdles 
to overcome including showing that such enforcement will not interrupt the main 
proceeding.
If a representative invokes the MLIJ where the judgment/order was granted by 
a main forum, because she so chooses or because the MLCBI is not available in 
the foreign country, then as a matter of principle, enforcement should be granted 
(if there are no problems concerning public policy/adequate protection). The juris-
diction bases within the refusal grounds in the MLIJ should be applied in line 
with the clarifications in the MLIJ Guide to Enactment and modified universalism 
157 See generally, Mevorach (2018b).
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(increasingly becoming an international norm) to view COMI as an acceptable juris-
dictional ground.
Indeed, if countries adopt the MLIJ driven by a reluctance to join the MLCBI, 
they may also be reluctant to interpret the MLIJ broadly in this way. Article X may 
also have no effect as it will not be enacted or be of assistance in the interpreta-
tion of the MLCBI (as this instrument will not be available in the domestic system). 
Thus, while the standalone document might encourage buy-in, the trade-off is an 
inconsistency problem. At the same time, it is frankly difficult to see why countries 
will find the MLIJ attractive only for the purpose of allowing representatives from 
other countries to enforce and recover assets in their jurisdictions, without partici-
pating more generally in the uniform cross-border border insolvency system which 
supports collective proceedings.
6.4  Alternative II: Integration of the Model Law on Judgments 
in the Cross‑Border Insolvency Framework
A more arduous task for legislators, but one which can ultimately promote a coherent 
system, would be to merge the MLIJ and the MLCBI into one instrument, whether 
the MLCBI is already law in the country or will be enacted at the time of enactment 
of the MLIJ. Especially if done in consultation with UNCITRAL, uniformity can 
be promoted and supported. An integrated approach promoted worldwide can also 
encourage more countries to adopt the MLCBI when they consider adoption of the 
MLIJ, thus advancing the cross-border insolvency system generally.158 It can also 
reassure countries that already adhere to a regime where recognition and relief is 
primarily to main proceedings, such as EU Member States, that the MLIJ will not 
deviate from that framework, urging more such countries to adopt the existing and 
new UNCITRAL model laws.159
Whilst it is possible just to slightly amend Article 21 of the MLCBI (to which 
the MLIJ refers in Article X) and note that additional discretionary relief that 
may be granted includes enforcement of judgments, a fuller amalgamation of the 
regimes could strengthen the framework. The MLIJ definitions where they do not 
already overlap with those in the MLCBI—importantly, the definition of insolvency-
related judgments—could be added as an elaboration of the definitions provided 
in the MLCBI (Article 2). The relief section in the MLCBI (Articles 19-21)160 as 
enacted in the country could be clarified to explicitly refer to the recognition and 
enforcement of insolvency-related judgments. In this context, the law could pro-
vide the detail of the procedure and conditions for the recognition and enforcement 
158 There is some indication of support to such approach in the INSOL Report which notes that ‘[n]early 
70% of the INSOL survey respondents support the incorporation of the [MLIJ] Model Law into existing 
cross-border insolvency regimes’ (INSOL International 2019, p 10).
159 See also McCormack and Anderson (2017), p 553 (noting that adoption of the MLCBI either by the 
EU or unilaterally by Member States, which have not already adopted it, would be ‘a welcome develop-
ment’ and that the EU and Member States should be assured by the fact that mandatory relief is only 
required regarding main proceeding under the MLCBI).
160 Relief in both the MLCBI and the MLIJ also includes provisional relief.
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of judgments as specified in the MLIJ. It could also simultaneously solidify the 
MLCBI as enacted (or when enacting it) by requiring, rather than just allowing, that 
following recognition as main proceeding, foreign judgments from this proceeding 
be recognized and enforced. In other words, Article X may not be enacted verbatim 
but inspire a more robust change in the law based on the main text of the MLIJ. It 
should also be clarified, in any event, that the judgment shall be given the same 
effect it has in the originating country or the same effect it would have had if it had 
been issued by a court in the recognizing country.
The MLIJ grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement akin to public policy 
(fraud, lack of notice, etc.) may be added and specified, or could be consumed by the 
general public policy safeguard already provided in Article 6 of the MLCBI. In any 
event, the consequences in practice are unlikely to be material. The adequate pro-
tection safeguard (Article 22 of the MLCBI) can be construed narrowly regarding 
the enforcement of judgments, to apply only to judgments which materially affect 
the rights of creditors generally, in line with the MLIJ. It should also be clarified 
that judgments would be enforced only where they are not inconsistent with other 
judgments as provided in the MLIJ and when they are enforceable in the original 
jurisdiction.
The additional grounds in Article 14(g) of the MLIJ that speak of consent/sub-
mission or other referrals to domestic laws may not be required when the insolvency 
proceeding is recognized as the main proceeding under the MLCBI. Proceedings 
recognized as foreign main proceedings would ideally receive the most support, 
including concerning orders and judgments, subject to public policy and adequate 
protection and unless there is inconsistency with another judgment. A distinction 
could be made explicitly in the law to clarify that recognition of the underlying pro-
ceedings as main proceedings suffices as a basis for recognition/enforcement of the 
judgments emanating from that jurisdiction (in line with Article X). No further anal-
ysis of ‘compatibility’ with domestic law may be required in such circumstances. In 
any event, application of the law and the enforcement process including the grounds 
to refuse enforcement in this way could fix Rubin and the rule in Gibbs.
Relief is also available to non-main proceedings (where the debtor has an estab-
lishment) under the MLCBI’s discretionary relief provision. However, as noted 
earlier, the MLCBI states that before granting relief to such proceedings, the court 
should be satisfied that the relief relates to assets that should be administered in the 
foreign non-main proceeding or concerns information required in that proceeding.161 
If the distinction between forms of proceedings is kept, a similar restriction should 
apply to the enforcement of judgments emanating from non-main proceedings.
Separate provisions can be added regarding the recognition/enforcement of insol-
vency-related judgments, which do not emanate from main or non-main proceed-
ings. In any event, regarding such judgments that do not emanate from proceedings 
recognized under the MLCBI, the full range of rejection grounds should apply, 
including where enforcement might interfere with the administration of the debt-
or’s insolvency process or because the foreign court did not have jurisdiction under 
161 See text to n. 47 above.
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recognized general private international law (submission, consent, etc.). Support 
might be restricted concerning such foreign judgments in view of existing or forth-
coming main proceedings or because there is no jurisdictional basis under the spe-
cial cross-border insolvency system for enforcing such judgments. Judgments may 
be enforced, however, in the circumstances specified in Article 14(h) of the MLIJ, 
namely when the insolvency representative of a recognized proceeding participated 
and engaged in the proceeding concerning the foreign judgment which relates solely 
to assets that were located in the originating State at the time of the proceeding.162
6.5  The Model Law on Judgments, and Groups
The MLCBI does not provide specific rules for groups—a gap that was addressed 
in 2019 as UNCITRAL introduced a new model law on enterprise group insolvency 
(MLEGI).163 This model law complements the MLCBI and provides specific mech-
anisms to achieve group solutions. The MLEGI tracks the MLCBI’s concepts of 
cooperation, coordination, recognition, relief, main and non-main proceedings and 
extends them to groups.164 It also adds new features unique to groups, importantly 
the concepts of ‘group insolvency solution’ which may be developed in a ‘plan-
ning proceeding’ thus supporting a concentrated process for the group as a whole 
(or a relevant part).165 The MLEGI provides mechanisms for deferring to that cen-
tral group process, avoiding opening local proceedings,166 and providing a range of 
relief to support that process.
Thus, MLEGI is an important addition to the global framework for international 
insolvency. When enacting MLIJ, consideration should be given to enacting MLEGI 
as well (or vice versa) and to ensuring consistency between the instruments. The 
interaction of MLEGI and MLIJ has not been considered and there is no equivalent 
of Article X to tell us how to read MLEGI in that regard. The MLEGI does work 
well as a separate instrument as it is in line and is fully consistent with the MLCBI, 
or it could be quite easily merged with the MLCBI. Importantly, the regime would 
be improved and become coherent if in the process it is clarified (in the law or in 
practice when the law is applied) that relief under the MLEGI includes the enforce-
ment of judgments and orders of the planning process, subject to public policy and 
adequate protection of the interests of creditors of each enterprise group member.167
162 MLIJ (n. 5 above), Art. 14(h)(ii).
163 UNCITRAL Model Law on Enterprise Groups Insolvency (2019) (advanced copy), https ://uncit ral.
un.org/sites /uncit ral.un.org/files /media -docum ents/uncit ral/en/mlegi _-_advan ce_pre-publi shed_versi on_-
_e.pdf.
164 Ibid., Chapter 2.
165 Ibid., Art. 2.
166 Ibid., Arts. 30–32.
167 Art. 27 of the MLEGI (n. 163 above) provides that ‘[i]n granting, denying, modifying or terminat-
ing relief under this Law, the court must be satisfied that the interests of the creditors of each enterprise 
group member subject to or participating in a planning proceeding and other interested persons, includ-
ing the enterprise group member subject to the relief to be granted, are adequately protected’.
 I. Mevorach 
123
6.6  Uniform Choice of Law Rules
With the adoption of the MLIJ and the MLEGI in 2018–2019, the cross-border 
insolvency system has become more complete (assuming the instruments will be 
enacted by a significant number of countries) but it is still missing an important 
piece—uniform rules on choice of law. The absence of choice of law rules can also 
impact the implementation and application of MLIJ. It was noted above how choice 
of (insolvency) law is intricately linked to the enforcement of (insolvency) judg-
ments (see the discussion above of the Gibbs rule168). When a local court is required 
to enforce a judgment or an order of a foreign court, it may indirectly also need to 
defer to the foreign law. If enforcement is based on cross-border insolvency-specific 
grounds like the fact that the foreign proceeding is the main proceeding, rather than 
the general domestic private international law rules, deference may not be readily 
accepted. Indeed, in Rubin, the court did not consider the issue of choice of law. It 
refused to enforce the avoidance judgment in the absence of submission or consent. 
It can be presumed that if the foreign court had exercised jurisdiction based on ordi-
nary (English) private international law, the English court would have enforced the 
judgment.169 It could also be the case that the judgment would have been enforced if 
the foreign court had applied English (avoidance) law.
To compare, in the EU, the position on enforcement is clear as judgments ema-
nating from the automatically recognized proceedings opened in a Member State 
must be enforced, and there are no additional refusal grounds beyond the public 
policy safeguard.170 But the EIR provides uniform rules concerning choice of law. 
Under this regime, the law of the main forum (lex fori concursus) applies,171 subject 
to a set of exceptions (and the possibility that secondary proceedings are opened).172
The MLCBI does not prohibit deference to the forum laws but does not explicitly 
provide which law applies in main or secondary proceedings. The original drafters 
of the MLCBI proceeded with caution when they, for the first time, designed an 
international framework for cross-border insolvency in 1997. They seemingly pre-
ferred to leave out an explicit relief concerning the application of foreign law,173 
allowing the practice to develop through the application of the MLCBI flexible 
provisions.174 But we have seen the consequences of vagueness in the cross-bor-
der insolvency instrument. Thus, while the enforcement of judgments in line with 
universalism is achievable, especially if the MLIJ is taken on board in the manner 
168 See text to nn. 56–58 above.
169 See Rubin and another v. Eurofinance SA and others and New Cap Reinsurance Corporation (in Liq-
uidation) and another v. AE Grant and others [2012] UKSC 46 where regarding New Cap, the court 
found that because the appellant had in fact submitted to the Australian Court’s jurisdiction, the normal 
common law test for enforcement was satisfied.
170 EIR (n. 32 above), Art. 32.
171 Ibid., Art. 7.
172 Ibid., Arts. 8–18.
173 See generally, Gropper (2014).
174 See generally, Gopalan and Guihot (2015) (arguing that the MLCBI was intentionally vague in vari-
ous areas).
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suggested above, it requires completion of the framework by implementing uniform, 
globally accepted rules on choice of law.175
7  Conclusion
The international community has clearly signalled its dissatisfaction about defec-
tions from modified universalism where the MLCBI regime was interpreted nar-
rowly regarding the enforcement of insolvency judgments. It was also concerned 
about gaps in private international law instruments, which exclude insolvency from 
their scope, including regarding the enforcement of judgments. The process of clos-
ing the gap by UNCITRAL through the development of the MLIJ has been arduous, 
however, in view of divergences of interpretation of the existing framework (in par-
ticular the MLCBI) and what is, in this light, the aim of the new instrument.
This article highlighted overlaps between the cross-border insolvency instruments 
and the risks of inconsistencies, which should inform the implementation process 
by countries as well as future application of the law following its adoption in legal 
systems. It was shown that the MLIJ does add vigour to the cross-border insolvency 
system where the requirement to enforce and manner for seeking enforcement of 
insolvency judgments is explicit and clear. The MLIJ should, therefore, be adopted 
widely. At the same time, ambiguities in this instrument concerning refusal grounds 
based on proper jurisdiction and inconsistencies with the MLCBI could undermine 
the system. Against this backdrop, the article considered different ways of imple-
menting the MLIJ and using it in future cases, with a view of maximizing its poten-
tial, including in view of further developments concerning enterprise groups and 
choice of law.
Apart from addressing an important weakness in the existing cross-border insol-
vency regime where the conditions for enforcing insolvency judgments have not 
been clear, the MLIJ serves as a prompt to countries to consider if their cross-border 
insolvency laws need improvement. In particular, as UNCITRAL notes in its deci-
sion to adopt the MLIJ, countries should ‘[…] continue to consider implementation 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)’.176 Such wide 
adoption of the MLCBI as well as the newer additions can increase preparedness for 
future international insolvencies.
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(United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, A/CN.9/798, Report of Working Group V 
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& Overy, 29 March 2019 where preliminary ideas concerning this article were presented. All mistakes 
made are solely the author’s.
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